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Abstract
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high perfor-
mance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We
link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population.
In particular, we identify conditions under which, even if punishment is costly, punishing the
bottom is more eﬀective than rewarding the top in eliciting eﬀort input . If punishment is
costless, we study the optimal number of punishments in the contest.
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11 Introduction
Contests are widely used to model political lobbying, sports competitions, job promotions, and
R&D races. In most cases, the contest’s organizer has some control over the structure of rewards
and punishments: teachers determine who passes and who fails the exam, a company sets rules
about promotions and layoﬀs, and sport governing bodies choose the number of teams advancing
to a higher league and the number of those relegated to a lower one.
In this paper we characterize the optimal prize structure in a contest where the designer can use
both rewards (carrots) and punishments (sticks) in order to motivate participants to exert eﬀort.1
This relaxes an important and restrictive assumption made in the existing literature who has only
examined positive prizes. Once we allow the designer to punish players who perform poorly, an
interesting question arises: when is it more eﬀective to punish the “bottom” and when is it more
eﬀective to reward the “top”?
Punishments can be costly or costless to the contest designer, and we study here both cases.
For example, in a labor tournament, the ﬁrm usually incurrs costs if it wants to ﬁre workers who
perform poorly (e.g., worker compensation, production disruption, or loss of clients). It could also
face replacement and search costs (e.g., a faculty denying tenure to some candidates). In other
instances, punishments can be almost costless to implement (e.g., relegation in sport tournaments).
We assume that the designer has a limited budget, which means that costly punishments cannot
be arbitrarily high. Subject to her budget constraint, the designer determines the number and size
of prizes in order to maximize the participants’ expected total eﬀort. In particular, some prizes can
be positive (rewards) or negative (punishments). Given the prize structure, players choose eﬀort
level to maximize their expected payoﬀ.
We show that the relative eﬀectiveness of punishments compared to rewards crucially depends
on the curvature of the distribution of player abilities. Exploiting results about normalized spacings
among order statistics developed by Barlow and Prochan (1966), we ﬁrst revisit one of the main
results in Moldovanu and Sela (2001): if punishment is not feasible, the optimal prize structure
oﬀers a single prize to the top performer. If rewards are not feasible, we then show that the designer
should only punish the player with the lowest performance if the distribution of abilities has an
increasing hazard (or failure) rate. If this last condition is not satisﬁed, more punishments may be
optimal.
1See Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) for a comprehensive discussion about the use of punishments in organizations.
2If the designer can punish as well as reward, the optimal prize structure will depend on the
relative marginal cost of punishments, and on the distribution of the players’ abilities. For example,
if the marginal cost of punishments is the same as the marginal cost of rewards, it is optimal to
punish the worst performing player if the distribution of abilities is convex. If that player is
punished, even high types will work hard to avoid performing worst because they know that there
is a relatively high probability that competitors also have high types.
Costless punishments are, of course, more attractive to the designer. We ﬁrst look at the
case where players have no exit option, and we show that the optimal number of punishments
is decreasing in the convexity of the ability distribution. Intuitively, when the distribution is
more convex, there are relatively more high ability players. In order to motivate participants to
work hard, the designer should diﬀerentiate between players with moderate performances and low
performances, rather than punishing all of them.
In many situation players have outside options, and thus they may choose not to participate in
the contest. Thus, the designer needs to satisfy an individual rationality constraint (chosen here to
be interim: the expected payoﬀ of a player, conditional on his ability, must be nonnegative). We
show that punishments continue to be eﬀective since they allow the designer to exclude low ability
participants, akin to entry fees or reserve prices.
The two papers most closely related to the present research are Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and
Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007). The ﬁrst develops an all-pay auction framework with incomplete
information in order to study the optimal allocation of several non-negative prizes (rewards) in
contests where the designer has a ﬁxed budget2. Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007) apply the all-pay
auction framework to analyze the incentive eﬀects of social status in organization design. In their
model, contestants who perform poorly have a low social status, and it is shown that the designer
can take advantage of the agents’ status concern in order to induce high eﬀort. That paper did not
study, however, the contest design problem with a general structure of rewards and punishments.
Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007) also introduced the Barlow-Proschan (1966) order statistics results
into the mechanism design literature.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on tournaments, initiated by Lazear and Rosen
(1981). That literature has shown how prizes based on rank-orders of performance can be eﬀectively
used to provide incentives in labor tournaments (see also Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuﬀ
2Other papers that study the eﬀects of multiple prizes in contests are Glazer and Hassin (1988), Barut and
Kovenock (1998), Clark and Riis (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
3and Stiglitz (1983)). The labor tournament model has been extended to analyze political lobbying
and research contests. For example, Che and Gale (1998) use an all-pay auction with complete
information to model political campaigns, and show how a cap on individual political contribution
may actually increase aggregate expenditures. In Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and
in Che and Gale (2003) research contests are modeled as rank-ordered tournaments and it is shown
that it is beneﬁcial to exclude some participants (see also Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993). In
these papers exclusion is costless for the designer.
In a recent paper, Akerlof and Holden (2007) extend the analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981) to
the case with multiple prizes. They link the optimal prize structure to the form of utility functions,
and show that the prize diﬀerence between two adjacent top players is often smaller than the prize
diﬀerence between two adjacent bottom players. Their model is quite diﬀerent from ours: they
assume that the relationship between eﬀort and performance is stochastic, and that agents are
homogeneous in abilities. Moreover, they do not model punishments as negative prizes. Finally,
we note that the experimental literature has collected extensive evidence about the eﬀectiveness of
punishments for inducing cooperation.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model framework and
characterizes the equilibrium. Costly punishment is studied in Section 3. The analysis of costless
punishment is contained in Section 4. There we divide the analysis into two parts, according to
whether the contestants can exit or not. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a contest with n players where each player j makes an eﬀort ej. For simplicity, we
postulate a deterministic relation between eﬀort and output, and assume these to be equal. Eﬀorts
are submitted simultaneously. An eﬀort ej causes a cost of ej/aj, where aj is an ability parameter.
The ability (or type) of contestant j is private information to j. Abilities are drawn indepen-
dently of each other from the interval [0,1] according to a distribution function F that is common
knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density f = dF > 0.
The designer can allocate n prizes to the n players: V1 ≤ V2 ≤     ≤ Vn. Each Vi can be positive
(a reward), zero or negative (a punishment). The contestant with the highest eﬀort wins the ﬁrst
prize Vn, the contestant with the second highest eﬀort wins the second prize Vn−1, and so on until
3See Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) and reference therein for details.
4all the prizes are allocated. The payoﬀ of contestant i who has ability ai and submits eﬀort ei is
Vj − ei/ai if i wins prize j.
Each contestant i chooses her eﬀort in order to maximize her expected utility (given the other
competitors’ eﬀorts and the values of the diﬀerent prizes). The contest designer determines the
number and size of prizes in order to maximize total expected eﬀort
￿n
i=1 ei.
We use the following notations:
1. Ak,n denotes k-th order statistic out of n independent variables independently distributed
according to F. Note that An,n is the highest order statistic, and so on...
2. Fk,n denotes the distribution of Ak,n , and fk,n denotes its density;
3. E(k,n) denotes the expected value of Ak,n, where we set E(0,n) = 0. Note that E(n,n) is
the expectation of the maximum, or highest order statistic, and so on...
2.1 Equilibrium Derivation and Total Eﬀort
We focus here on a symmetric equilibrium. Let β (a) denote the “bidding” strategy for the player
with type a. This function relates ability to equilibrium eﬀort. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium
in strictly increasing strategies and applying the revelation principle, we can formulate the player’s
optimization problem as follows: player j with ability a chooses to behave as an agent with ability











i (s) denotes the probability that a player’s type s ranks exactly i-th lowest among n
random variables distributed according to F. The ﬁrst term represent the expected payment from




(i − 1)!(n − i)!
[F(s)]i−1[1 − F(s)]n−i, i = 1,2,...,n.
Deﬁne Fn,n−1(s) ≡ 0 and F0,n−1(s) ≡ 1 for all s ∈ [0,1]. Then it is immediate that Fn
i (s) =









5In equilibrium, the above maximization problem must be solved by s = a, and the solution of









[fi−1,n−1(x) − fi,n−1(x)]Vi + fn−1,n−1(x)Vn
￿
dx. (1)






























where the ﬁrst equality follows from integration by part. We further observe that









f(a)da = (n − r)E (r,n).
By repeatedly applying above equation, the expected total eﬀort becomes
Etotal = Etotal(V1,V2,...,Vn) =
n ￿
i=1
[(n − i + 1)E (i − 1,n) − (n − i)E (i,n)]Vi. (2)
It is clear from (2) that the expected total eﬀort (Etotal) is linear in prizes Vi (i = 1,..,n). Thus,
the optimal prize structure will depend on the magnitude of the diﬀerent marginal eﬀects of each
prize.
3 The Optimal Prize Structure with Costly Punishments
We begin by studying the optimal prize structure when punishment is costly to the designer, and
when the designer faces a ﬁxed budget. Throughout this section, players have no option of quitting
the contest.
The designer has a budget P < ∞. The marginal cost of providing a unit of positive prize is
normalized to 1, while the marginal cost of providing a unit of negative prize is denoted by γ > 0.
6Without loss of generality, suppose there are J (0 ≤ J ≤ n) negative prizes. That is, Vj < 0 for











That is, the designer chooses the prize structure to maximize total expected eﬀort subject to the
constraint that the monetary cost of rewards and punishments cannot exceed the budget P. Since
both the objective function and the constraint are linear in prizes, the key objects are the marginal
gains in expected total eﬀort from increasing punishments or rewards.
We start with a simple proof of one of the main results in Moldovanu and Sela (2001). They
show that if the eﬀort cost function is linear in eﬀort input (which is satisﬁed here) a winner-takes-all
contest is optimal among all those that award only non-negative prizes (rewards).
Proposition 1 If only rewards can be allocated, then, for every distribution function F, the optimal
prize structure is Vn = P and Vi = 0 for all i < n.
Proof. The marginal gain in eﬀort by spending one more dollar in rewarding players is
∂Etotal
∂Vi
= (n − i + 1)E (i − 1,n) − (n − i)E (i,n)




= E (n − 1,n) ≥ 0






= E (n − 1,n) − E(i,n) + (n − i + 1)[E (i,n) − E (i − 1,n)] ≥ 0
Thus, the designer optimally rewards only the player with the highest eﬀort.
Next, we allow the designer to punish players with poor performance. It turns out that the
optimal prize structure is then related to the curvature of the ability distribution F. A key concept
for our analysis is the failure rate (or hazard rate) deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The failure rate (or hazard rate) of a distribution F is given by:
λ(x) =
f (x)
1 − F (x)
A distribution function F has an increasing failure rate (IFR) if its failure rate, λ(x), is increasing.
7The following results, due to Barlow and Proschan (1966), link properties of order statistics to
properties of the distribution F. We will use these results repeatedly throughout the paper:
Lemma 1 (a). Let F and G be two distributions such that F (0) = G(0) = 0, and let G−1F be
convex on the support of F. Then EF (i,n)/EG (i,n) is decreasing in i for a ﬁxed n.
(b). Assume that a distribution F with F(0) = 0 is convex (concave). Then E(i,n)/i is decreasing
(increasing) in i for a ﬁxed n.
(c). Assume that a distribution F with F(0) = 0 satisﬁes IFR. Then (n−i+1)(Ai,n −Ai−1,n) is
stochastically decreasing in i for a ﬁxed n.
By applying Lemma 1-(c), we can prove a counterpart to Proposition 1 for the case where only
punishments are allowed:
Proposition 2 If only punishments can be allocated, and if the distribution of abilities F satisﬁes
IFR, then the optimal prize structure is V1 = −P




= (n − i + 1)E (i − 1,n) − (n − i)E (i,n)
= E(i,n) − (n − i + 1)[E (i,n) − E (i − 1,n)], 1 ≤ i ≤ n
If the distribution F satisﬁes IFR, then, by Lemma 1-(c), (n − i + 1)(Ai,n − Ai−1,n) is stochastically
decreasing in i, and thus − (n − i + 1)[E (i,n)−E (i − 1,n)] is increasing in i. Since E(i,n) always
increases in i, we obtain that ∂Etotal
∂Vi is increasing in i when F satisﬁes IFR.
If the designer cannot use rewards, only negative terms of the form ∂Etotal
∂Vi are relevant for the
designer’s optimal decision. Note that, for any distribution of abilities,
∂Etotal
∂V1
= −(n − 1)E(1,n) < 0
Since ∂Etotal
∂Vi is here increasing in i, ∂Etotal
∂V1 must have the highest absolute value among all negative
terms. Consequently, it is most eﬀective to only punish the player with the lowest eﬀort.
It is important to note that, in contrast to Proposition 1 that holds for any distribution, Propo-
sition 2 holds only under the IFR requirement. The intuition is as follows: the highest punishment
is used to “threaten” the players with low abilities. If the ability distribution has IFR, then
8the diﬀerences between middle expected abilities and the lowest expected one are relatively small.
Therefore, many players are “threatened” by the highest punishment, which makes it quite eﬀective.
The following example illustrates that it may not be optimal to punish only the player with the
lowest eﬀort if the distribution of abilities does not satisfy IFR:
Example 1 Let F(x) =
w √
x and γ = 1. Then E (i,n) =
n!(w+i−1)!
(i−1)!(n+w)!. It is easy to verify that F










(2(n − 1) − (w + 1)(n − 2)) < 0.
The above holds, for example, if n = 3 and w > 3.
We proceed now to investigate the optimal prize structure when both rewards and punishments
are allowed. If the distribution F satisﬁes IFR, then, by the above results, the optimal prize
structure hinges on the comparison between rewarding the top and punishing the bottom: we only
need to compare the eﬀectiveness of the the top reward and the bottom punishment, which depends
on the comparison between the absolute values of ∂Etotal
∂V1 = −(n − 1)E(1,n) and of γ ∂Etotal
∂Vn =
γE (n − 1,n) :
Proposition 3 Suppose that the distribution of abilities F satisﬁes IFR.
1. If (n − 1)E (1,n) > γE (n − 1,n), then the optimal prize structure is V1 = −P
γ and Vi = 0
for all i > 1.
2. If (n − 1)E (1,n) ≤ γE (n − 1,n), then the optimal prize structure is Vn = P and Vi = 0 for
all i < n.
As a special case, let us assume for the next result that the marginal cost to reward and to
punish is the same, that is γ = 1. We obtain then:
Proposition 4 Assume that γ = 1.
1. If the distribution of abilities F is convex, the optimal prize structure is V1 = −P and Vi = 0
for all i > 1.
2. If the distribution of abilities F is concave and satisﬁes IFR, then the optimal prize structure
is Vn = P and Vi = 0 for all i < n.
93. If F is concave (not necessarily IFR) then the optimal prize structure may include up to n
2
punishments.
Proof. 1) By Lemma 1-(b), if F is convex then E(i,n)/i is decreasing in i. Thus, we have
(n − 1)E (1,n) > E (n − 1,n).
The result follows from Proposition 3, since F convex implies that F satisﬁes IFR.
2) If F is concave then E(i,n)/i is increasing in i (Lemma 1-(b)). In particular, (n − 1)E (1,n) <
E (n − 1,n), and the result follows from Proposition 3.












n − i + 1
















The last result implies that, when the marginal cost of rewards and punishments are the same,
the eﬀectiveness of punishing the player with the lowest eﬀort equals the eﬀectiveness of rewarding
the player with the highest eﬀort for a uniform distribution of abilities.
3.1 Fixed Punishment Values
In this subsection we assume that all punishments have a ﬁxed value for the agents and a ﬁxed
cost for the designer. For example, think of a ﬁrm who can choose the number of workers to ﬁre in
a recession: it is reasonable to assume that the cost of each layoﬀ is ﬁxed for the ﬁrm (e.g., some
compensation that needs to be paid to each ﬁred worker), and for the workers themselves (e.g, the
diﬀerence between a ﬁxed wage and a lower unemployment aid).
Thus, we assume here that there are q punishments, each yielding utility −U ≤ 0 to agents, at
a cost for the designer of γU per punishment. Given our results in the previous section, we assume
10that only the player with the highest eﬀort is rewarded by Vn ≥ 0. Assume also that F satisﬁes
IFR.
Since the designer is not able to shift the entire budget to one, big punishment for the agent with
the lowest performance, and since the value/cost of punishments is ﬁxed, the interesting question






[(n − i + 1)E (i − 1,n) − (n − i)E (i,n)](−U) + E (n − 1,n)Vn




= (n − i + 1)E (i − 1,n) − (n − i)E (i,n)
= E(i,n) − (n − i + 1)[E (i,n) − E (i − 1,n)], 1 ≤ i ≤ n
is increasing in i when F satisﬁes IFR.
If ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Etotal
∂V1
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ≤ γ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Etotal
∂Vn
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
then it is optimal to have no punishments: q = 0, and Vn = P.




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Etotal
∂Vi∗
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > γ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Etotal
∂Vn
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Since ∂Etotal








￿ ￿ ￿ , i∗ is well deﬁned. Note that for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗ it must hold that ∂Etotal
∂Vi ≤ 0. Thus, it is optimal to set i∗ punishments: q = i∗ and
Vn = P − i∗γU.
4 The Optimal Prize Structure with Costless Punishments
We assume now that punishments are costless, that is, γ = 0. As long as the designer need not worry
about the participation constraint, punishments will necessarily be part of the optimal incentive
scheme.
Given our results in the previous section, we assume here that only the player with the highest
eﬀort is rewarded. We focus then on the following question: what is the optimal number of identical,
11costless punishments? In contrast to the previous section, this section assumes that the magnitude
of the punishment is ﬁxed and is not subject to optimization.
We ﬁrst study the situation where the players’ participation is mandatory. Then, we move
to the case where the players can choose to quit the contest, and therefore the designer needs to
respect the participation constraints.
4.1 Contests without exit
We assume here that no player has the option to stay out of the contest. Therefore, punishing the
bottom player (setting V1 < 0) will always increase the total eﬀort. Denote by q ≥ 1 the number
of punishments.
By (2), total eﬀort is given by
Etotal = VnE(n − 1,n) − V1(n − q)E(q,n). (3)
The following proposition summarizes a general relation between the optimal number of punish-
ments and the distribution of the players’ abilities.
Proposition 5 Assume that γ = 0, and consider two distributions of abilities G,F leading to
optimal numbers of punishments qG and qF, respectively. If G−1F is convex then qG ≥ qF.
Proof. Since qF is optimal for F, we have for all q < qF,







In order to show that qG ≥ qF, it is suﬃcient to show that, under the distribution G, total
eﬀort induced by qF punishments is larger than total eﬀort induced by q < qF punishments. That
is, we need to show that, for q < qF,













The last inequality follows from Lemma 1-(a).
A simple corollary is:
12Corollary 1 Assume that γ = 0. If the distribution of abilities F is convex (concave), then the
optimal number of punishments is smaller (larger) than n/2.














(n − 2q) = 0.
Thus q = n/2. The result follows then by Proposition 5 .
By punishing less players, high ability players know that if they exert some eﬀort they can avoid
punishment. Conversely, if the designer punishes more players, high ability players get discouraged
because they may get punished even if they work hard. The result follows intuitively since a convex
(concave) distribution puts more (less) weight on high abilities than a uniform one.
4.2 Contests with exit
We consider now the case where only types with positive expected payoﬀs participate in the contest,
while the other players stay out. We assume again that there is one reward Vn ≥ 0, and q ≥ 1
punishments, each equal to V1 ≥ −Vn. If only one player participates, we assume that he receives
a reduced prize worth Vn + V1.
Let a∗ denote the type of a player who is indiﬀerent between attending the contest and staying
out. The maximization problem of a player with type a is
max
s VnFn














(F (s) − F(a∗))i−1 [1 − F (s) + F(a∗)]
n−i ,
is the probability that a player with type s ranks i-th lowest among the players who enter the
contest. Let
G(s) = F(s) − F(a∗).









13If a player with type a∗ enters the contest then, by the deﬁnition of a∗, she gets for sure the negative
prize V1 and wins the positive prize Vn only if all other players have lower types. That is, the cutoﬀ
a∗ is given by
VnF(a∗)n−1 = −V1. (4)
The necessary ﬁrst-order condition for an agent’s maximization problem is









To simplify notation, we deﬁne






q−1 [1 − G(s)]
n−q−1 .





Vnsfn−1,n−1 (s) − V1sφq,n−1 (s)f (s)
￿
ds (5)





Interestingly, even though the players are allowed to quit the contest, punishments have a role
to play in maximizing the expected total eﬀort from the participating players, analogously to the
beneﬁcial role of an entry fee or minimal eﬀort requirement.
Proposition 6 Assume that γ = 0, and assume that agents have the option not to participate
(which yields zero utility). Then it is always optimal to punish, i.e., V1 < 0.
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= a∗ (n − 1)F (a∗)
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Therefore, punishments are always eﬃcient even in the contest with exit.
Example 2 Consider a contest with two players who have the option not to participate. Ob-
viously, at most one player can be then punished. Noting that φ1,1 (s) = 1, we get β(a) =
￿ a


































1 − 3V1 + 1
￿
,
which is maximized for V1 = −0.16.
Finally, we want to note that, in some situations, other mechanisms for exclusion may perform
better than punishments. For example, punishments that are not pecuniary (i.e., negative prizes
that are not paid to the designer) are dominated by a contest with an entry fee that the designer
can collect. This can be easily seen by setting an entry fee that excludes the same set of types as
a given negative prize.
155 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the eﬀect of punishments in contests and derived the optimal prize structures
in several environments with both costly and costless punishment. Our main results link the prize
structure to features of the distribution of ability in the population, and to the marginal costs
of rewards versus punishments. In particular, we give conditions under which rewarding the top
performers is more (less) eﬀective than punishing the worst performers. Finally, we have shown
that punishments may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on eﬀort even if contestants have the option not
to participate. Our present analysis completes the picture versus a large literature that has only
considered positive prizes (rewards).
6 References
1. Akerlof, Robert and Holden Richard (2007), “The Nature of Tournaments," working paper,
Sloan School of Management, MIT.
2. Andreoni J., W. Harbaugh and L. Vesterlund (2003), “The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards,
Punishments, and Cooperation,” American Economic Review 93, 893-902.
3. Arvey, Richard D. and John M. Ivancevich (1980), “Punishment in Organizations: A Review,
Propositions, and Research Suggestions. Academy of Management Review 5, 123-132.
4. Barlow, Richard and Frank Proschan (1966), “Inequalities for Linear Combinations of Order
Statistics from Restricted Families,” Ann. Math. Statistic. 37, 1593-1601.
5. Baye, M., Kovenock, D., and de Vries, C. (1993), “Rigging the Lobbying Process,” American
Economic Review, 83, 289-294.
6. Barut, Y., and Kovenock, D. (1998), “The Symmetric Multiple Prize All-Pay Auction with
Complete Information,” European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 627-644.
7. Che, Y., and Gale, I. (2003), “Optimal Design of Research Contests,” American Economic
Review, 93, 646-671.
8. Clark, D., and Riis, C. (1998), “Competition over More than One Prize,” American Economic
Review, 88, 276-289.
9. Glazer, A., and Hassin, R. (1988), “Optimal Contests,” Economic Inquiry, 26, 133-143.
1610. Green, Jerry, and Nancy Stokey (1983), “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts,”
Journal of Political Economy 91(3): 349-364.
11. Lazear, Edward and Sherwin Rosen (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 841-864.
12. Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela (2001), “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,”
American Economic Review 91(3), 542-558.
13. Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela (2006), “Contest Architecture,” Journal of Economic The-
ory 126(1): 70-97.
14. Moldovanu, Benny, Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi (2007), “Contests for Status,” Journal of
Political Economy, 115(2), 338-363.
15. Nalebuﬀ, Barry and Joseph Stiglitz (1983), “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory
of Compensation and Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics 14(1): 21-43.
17